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ABSTRACT 
Research on spreadsheet errors is substantial, compelling, and unanimous. It has three simple 
conclusions. The first is that spreadsheet errors are rare on a per-cell basis, but in large programs, at 
least one incorrect bottom-line value is very likely to be present. The second is that errors are 
extremely difficult to detect and correct. The third is that spreadsheet developers and corporations are 
highly overconfident in the accuracy of their spreadsheets. The disconnect between the first two 
conclusions and the third appears to be due to the way human cognition works. Most importantly, we 
are aware of very few of the errors we make. In addition, while we are proudly aware of errors that we 
fix, we have no idea of how many remain, but like Little Jack Horner we are impressed with our 
ability to ferret out errors. This paper reviews human cognition processes and shows first that humans 
cannot be error free no matter how hard they try, and second that our intuition about errors and how 
we can reduce them is based on appallingly bad knowledge. This paper argues that we should reject 
any prescription for reducing errors that has not been rigorously proven safe and effective. This paper 
also argues that our biggest need, based on empirical data, is to do massively more testing than we do 
now. It suggests that the code inspection methodology developed in software development is likely to 
apply very well to spreadsheet inspection. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Research on spreadsheet errors is substantial, compelling, and unanimous. As we will see later, all 
empirical studies, without exception, have found errors at frequencies that few would call acceptable. 
Actually, if we had done no spreadsheet research at all, results from human error research in other 
fields would have given us all the data we need to treat spreadsheet error risks seriously. 
Yet few developers or corporations have responded to the error research by the only means that has 
proven effective in other human cognitive domains: massive testing. The problem seems to be that the 
error rate results do not “feel right”. In our experience, we do not make as many errors as the literature 
says we do, we catch far more errors than the literature says we do, our spreadsheets are rarely 
materially incorrect, and the steps we take to make our spreadsheets error free are effective. In the 
words of American comedian Stephen Colbert, the results that suggest otherwise lack the feeling of 
“truthiness.” This is true despite the fact that every empirical study has found overconfidence in the 
face of many errors.  
At the root of this disconnect between research findings and our error beliefs, this paper argues, are 
the fundamental ways in which human attention and cognition work. We will begin the discussion by 
looking at how our cognition presents the world to us. We will see that our cognition edits out 
anything that is unimportant, including most errors. This distorts our “experience” of errors, and this 
distorted experience is what drives our intuition about error risks. Furthermore, our cognition makes 
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us confident that our “constructed reality” is accurate. Pilots learn that when they are flying through a 
cloud, they need to trust the data from their instruments, not their perceptions. Business professionals 
arguably need to do the same when they deal with how they should build and test spreadsheets. 
If we do accept spreadsheet error research as being correct, then what should we do in response? We 
will argue that serious error reduction is likely to be predominantly about testing but not testing as we 
now do it. Testing based on research will be far more expensive. The “bottom line” is that spreadsheet 
programs are not error-prone. People are error prone. To use spreadsheet programs is not wrong, but 
using those that are not tested by research-based methods is. 
2 THE EVIDENCE 
We will not go over the evidence for the prevalence of spreadsheet errors in detail. Tables of results 
can be found at panko.com, under both human error and spreadsheet error research. Spreadsheet error 
research is a tiny corner of the human error research field, so much research on spreadsheet errors has 
focused on seeing if human error research results apply to spreadsheet error. The brief answer is that 
they apply very well. 
2.1 Error Rates during Development 
In the 1980s, there was a kind of Grand Unification in human error research. Researchers in different 
domains found that their error rates were nearly identical for tasks of comparable cognitive 
complexity. These error rates were reported as base error rates (BERs), which are long-term average 
error rates quantified as the number of errors per 100 actions. 
BERs obviously depend on complexity. For simple but nontrivial cognitive actions such as writing, 
calculating, and writing program statements, BERs are usually in the range of 1% to 5%. This is 
found in both experiments and data collection in real organizations. Programming BERs are based on 
particularly large corpuses of actual software testing in corporations. Table 1 shows four such 
corpuses totaling around 10,000 code inspections in industry. These data come from the Panko human 
error website, which also has data on smaller corpuses. The average error rates of the four corpuses 
ranged from 1.9% to 3.7%. 
Table 1: Error Rates in Program Statements and Spreadsheet Cells 
Cognitive Activity Error 
Rate 
Study 
More than 6,000 code inspections in industry, per 
line of code. 
1.9% Weller [1993] 
National Software Quality Experiment, per line of 
code. 
2.0% O'Neill [1994] 
2,500 inspections at Cisco Systems, per line of code. 3.2% Cohen [2006] 
AT&T. 2.5 million lines of code over 8 software 
releases, per line of code. 
3.7% Graden and Horsley [1986] 
14 laboratory studies of spreadsheet development, 
967 participants working alone on a variety of tasks. 
Cell error rate 
3.9% Panko Spreadsheet Research 
Website 
 
Based on human error research, we would expect spreadsheet cell error rates to in the range of 1% to 
5%. Table 1 summarizes results from 14 laboratories spreadsheet development studies involving 967 
individuals working alone on a variety of tasks. These numbers come from the Panko spreadsheet 
research website. The average across these studies is a cell error rate of 3.9%. 
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These per-cell error rates are small. However, spreadsheets contain many cells, and the probability of 
an error increases rapidly when there are many calculations that depend on precedent cells. Figure 1 
shows the importance of error compounding over chains of calculations. The top line in the figure is 
for a spreadsheet with 100 cells in cascades. This might be a single cascade of 100 cells, 25 cascades 
of 4 cells, 10 cascades of 10 cells, or any other combination. This might be 100 root (non-copied) 
formulas, although copying is not error-free, especially when the formula changes in “copied” cells in 
complex ways. 
Figure 1: Cell Error Rates and Probabilities of a Bottom-Line Error 
 
 
Spreadsheets with 100 or more cells in cascades are plausible to consider given the size of corporate 
spreadsheets. Hermans and Murphy-Hill [2015] analyzed spreadsheets obtained during the legal 
discovery process at Enron. This corpus included 9,120 Enron spreadsheets with formulas. In these 
spreadsheets, they found 20,277,835 cells with formulas. Other censuses of spreadsheets have also 
revealed massive numbers of large spreadsheets. For example, McDaid, et al. [2011] found 65,806 
spreadsheets on the department servers in two organizations. These spreadsheets averaged over 4,000 
formulas. Even with extensive copying, the number of root formulas must have been extremely large 
in both corpuses. 
Figure 1shows that for cell error rates of 1% to 5%, the probability of a calculation error is 
overwhelming. In fact, even error rates an order of magnitude lower would give error probabilities 
that any company would view as unacceptable. A second line gives the probability of a bottom line 
error in a spreadsheet with a mere 25 cells in cascades. Here too, likely cell error rates give lower but 
still unacceptable error rates. 
Are bottom-line error rates in real spreadsheets consistent with Figure 1? Table 2 shows that the 
answer is yes. The table shows the results of 85 intensive inspection studies that took several days per 
spreadsheet. Most were done by commercial spreadsheet “auditing” firms. One was done by a 
government tax collection unit using a strong methodology that included substantial cell-by-cell 
inspection. Hicks [1991] used software code inspection methodology with a team of three inspectors 
to examine a spreadsheet module. Collectively, these studies found errors in 94% of the spreadsheets 
studied. 
 
 
Most Likely 
CER Range 
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Table 2: Errors Found in Operation Spreadsheets during Intensive Inspection 
Authors Spreadsheets Percent with Errors Cell Error Rate Methodology 
Hicks [1995] 1 100% 1.2% Fagan Code Inspection with 
a Team of Three 
Coopers and Lybrand [1997] 23 91%  Commercial “Audit” 
KPMG [1998] 22 91%  Commercial “Audit” 
Lukasic [1998] 2 100% 2.2%, 2.5% Reproduction in a Financial 
Modeling Language 
Butler [2000] 7 86%  Audit of Spreadsheet 
Submitted with Taxes in 
the United Kingdom 
Lawrence and Lee [2001] 30 100%  Commercial “Audit” 
Total / Weighted Average 85 94%   
 
Note also that two studies reported cell error rates. These are similar to those expected from human 
error research and similar to those found in spreadsheet development experiments. 
2.2 Errors Detected During Inspection 
Given likely error rates in operational spreadsheets, extensive testing will be needed—more extensive 
than the testing that was done on operational spreadsheets. 
Effective testing is likely to be difficult and extremely expensive. Although people are 95% to 99% 
accurate when they do calculations, write, code, or enter spreadsheet cells, human error research has 
shown that humans are much worse at finding errors that have occurred. 
Data from the Panko human error website on proofreading for spelling shows that detection rates are 
81% for simple spelling errors but only 66% for more complex spelling errors. Detection rates 
plummet for longer words [Healey, 1980] and more complex material [Riefer,1991]. 
In software development, error detection rates are only 20% to 40% [Basili and Selby, 1986; Johnson 
and Tjahjono, 1997; Myers, 1978; Porter, Votta, and Basili, 1995; Porter and Johnson, 1997; Porter, 
Sly, Toman, and Votta, 1997; Porter and Votta, 1994] when single inspectors examine a code module 
to look for errors. This is why software code inspection is always done in teams of three to five or 
more [Fagan, 1976 1986; Gilb and Graham, 1993; Cohen, 2006]. 
In spreadsheet inspection, nine experiments using over 1,000 participants in total have found average 
error detection rates of 60%. However, detection rates depend heavily on error complexity. Even 
simple and obvious errors are not detected with close to 100 percent accuracy. Anderson [2004] 
published data for different types of error in his study, which was done by experienced spreadsheet 
developers. Of 14 errors with different ranges of complexity, three had detection rates below 10%, 
and half had detection rates below 40%. Even the simplest errors were caught by fewer than 60% of 
the participants, and no participant found all errors. 
What type of errors do people make when they build spreadsheets? Panko and Halverson [1996] 
divided spreadsheet errors into logical (mathematical and domain knowledge) errors, mechanical 
errors (such as pointing to the wrong cell and typing errors), and omission errors (leaving out a 
necessary component). In one experiment, Panko and Halverson [2001] Found that 45% of errors that 
participants made were logic errors, 23% were mechanical errors, and 31% were omission errors. In 
another study using a different task, Panko and Sprague [1998] found that 44% of the total errors were 
logic errors, 3% were mechanical errors, and a whopping 53% were omission errors. The large 
number of omission errors in this study was an anomaly of the task statement wording. The statement 
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specified that “Both walls will be built by crews of two. Crews will work three eight-hour days to 
build either type of wall.” Almost all omission errors occurred when the participants omitted the 
number of members per crew, the number of days per wall, or the number of hours per day. Their 
memory was overloaded. This type of error is called a lapse in human error research. In an inspection 
of an operational spreadsheet using the Fagan [1976, 1986] methodology, Hicks [1995] found that 
most errors in the spreadsheet his team examined were logic errors. Omission errors were also widely 
seen in spreadsheet studies. In the Brown and Gould [1987] experiment, when omission errors were 
excluded, 44% of the spreadsheet models had errors. When omission errors were included, this rose to 
63%. Omission errors are especially dangerous because their detection rate tends to be very low, 
especially if the omission error is due to a misinterpretation of the situation [Reason, 1990; Woods 
1984]. 
2.3 Inexperience, Rushing, and Exacerbaters 
Rushing, inexperience, code complexity, stress, and other factors can exacerbate error rates. However, 
as Figure 2 illustrates, reducing exacerbaters does not eliminate errors. There usually is a floor beyond 
which error reduction is minimal. Under extremely unchallenging conditions, error rates may even 
increase. 
Figure 2: Error Exacerbation 
 
Table 3 shows how errors relate to stress [Swain and Guttman, 1983]. It shows multipliers of 
“normal” BERs under different conditions. If the BER under normal conditions is 2.1%, and if the 
multiplier is 2, then a BER of 4.2% is likely. The table shows that error rates actually increase under 
very low stress. 
Table 3: Multipliers of "Normal" BERs by Experience, Stress, and Task Type 
 Skilled Novices Ratio 
Very Low Stress 
   Step-by-step task x2 x2 1:1 
   Dynamic task x2 x2 1:1 
Optimum Stress 
   Step-by-step task x1 x1 1:1 
   Dynamic task x1 x2 2:1 
Moderately High Stress 
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   Step-by-step task x2 x4 2:1 
   Dynamic task x5 x10 2:1 
Source: Swain and Guttman [1983], Table 18-1. 
Notes: 
The nominal human error probability for a task is multiplied by the modifiers. For instance, if the normal human error 
probability is 1.2% for a dynamic task under optimum stress done by an experienced practitioner, the estimated human 
error probability to use for novices under these conditions will be 1.2% x 2, or 2.4%. 
Novice workers have been doing the task less than six months, while skilled workers have been doing the task more than 
six months. The task is not done full time during this period, simply to a normal degree. 
Step-by-step tasks are guided by formal procedures. Dynamic tasks require diagnosis and decision-making, keeping track of 
multiple functions, and so forth. 
 
Many believe intuitively that experienced developers make hardly any errors. Table 3 compares error 
multipliers for inexperienced practitioners with less than six months of experience and those with 
more. Beyond about six months, error rates do not go down appreciably [Swain and Guttman, 1983]. 
Note that only as stress increases do inexperienced versus experienced error ratios reach 2:1. It does 
not go higher. This limited error benefit of experience surprises many. However, an error ratio of 
about 2:1 for inexperienced and experienced practitioners is commonly seen in other studies 
comparing error rates for inexperienced and experienced people [Grudin,1993; Hayes et al., 1985; 
Ledgard,1980; Lesgold, et al., 1988; and Reisner 1975] 
Experience increases many aspects of performance, although performance growth often plateaus for 
long periods or permanently [Bereiter and Scardamalia,1993]. Figure 3 shows this type of 
performance growth. It also shows error rates falling initially but quickly reaching a floor. Experience, 
even with diligent analysis and appraisal, does not decrease errors beyond some level. 
Figure 3: Experience, Performance, and Error Rates 
 
 
 
We have been looking at expertise in spreadsheet  development. For spreadsheet error detection, in 
turn, Galletta et al. [1993] found that spreadsheet experience had no impact on error yield, although 
higher experience did decrease the time spent in inspection. Studies of error detection listed at the 
Panko Human Error Website often used the same spreadsheet detection task and methodology. They 
had approximately the same results regardless of who was doing the inspection. 
Proceedings of the EuSpRIG 2015 Conference “Spreadsheet Risk Management” ISBN: 978-1-905404-52-0 
Copyright © 2015, European Spreadsheet Risks Interest Group (www.eusprig.org) & the Author(s) 
Page 7/15 
3 PERCEIVING AND THINKING 
We will begin by looking at human cognition. Humans intuitively feel that if we work carefully and 
check our work carefully, we will make hardly any errors. Although this is not seen in reality, it is a 
fundamental belief. Where does this belief come from? 
Cognition involves two stages: perceiving and thinking. Perceiving encompasses our brain sensing 
and selecting what we will pay attention to. Thinking is how we use this information to decide what 
we will do. Both perceiving and thinking, we will see, are subject to extensive processing that allows 
us to be fast and flexible but never quite perfect. Valiant [2013] has summarized this by saying that 
the brain’s goal is to be “probably approximately correct.” This is sufficient for most situations in life, 
but there are situations in which error tolerances are far smaller. In these situations, we need to work 
very differently, and our intuition often does not see the need to do so. 
3.1 Perceiving: Constructed Reality 
Our brains do not simply pull data from our senses and draw results on a large screen in our brain for 
us to look at. Instead, it goes through several processing steps to develop a consistent and cohesive 
picture from the dizzying flood of sensations entering out bodies. 
Figure 4 shows various steps that our brain uses to process the world around us based on vision, 
drawing primarily from Panko [2013]. Our eyes can only focus a tiny area directly in front of our gaze 
direction, so our gaze jerks around constantly in quick small jumps called saccades. Our brains govern 
these saccades, directing our gaze to things that the brain judges we need to see more clearly. It is like 
having a flashlight with a narrow beam and focusing it quickly in different directions. Our eyes make 
about 100,000 saccades per day [Mozlin, 2012]. To make the final picture coherent, however, our 
brains hide all of this complexity from us. We do not notice that most of what we see around us is out 
of focus. In addition, even if we try to pay attention to our saccades, we cannot. 
Figure 4: Constructed Reality x 
 
 
The next gate is attention. We can only pay attention to a tiny fraction of what is around us, so our 
brain filters out whatever it judges to be irrelevant. If we close our eyes and are asked questions about 
what we just saw, we will be able to recall only a few features of our environment [Chabris and 
Simons 2010]. However, our brain gives us the comforting illusion that we are taking in what is 
around us in considerable detail. 
Fortunately, our brain does not merely filter out; it also enhances. For example, if we are a batter and 
watch a pitcher in baseball throw a ball at us, it takes our brain quite a while to get information from 
our eyes. To compensate, the brain adjusts for this. What we “see” in this constructed reality is the 
ball further along its trajectory, so that we can swing appropriately [Chow, 2013]. The brain’s editing 
is artful editing. Again, such adjustments are hidden from us. 
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3.2 Thinking: System 1 and System 2 
Constructed reality is not created for our aesthetic enjoyment. It exists to give us the ability to think 
about the world. It is the “data” we use in our mental computations. Unfortunately, just as constructed 
reality gives us a vision of the world that is probably approximately correct, while our thinking is 
enormously fast, it also adds to our limitations. 
System 1 Thinking 
Kahneman [2011] has noted that we appear to have two different thinking “systems”—System 1 (S1) 
and System 2 (S2). 
System 1 is our default thinking method. Suppose that we are told that revenues are $1,000, that 
expenses are $800, and that we should calculate income. We will quickly say, “$200,” and that is the 
correct answer. For obvious reasons, Kahneman [2011] calls S1 thinking “thinking fast.” Thinking 
fast is not only fast. We are confident in its conclusions. When you thought “$200,” you were not 
tentative in you answer. 
Consider another example of thinking fast [Kahneman 2011]. Suppose that a bat costs a dollar more 
than a ball, and that the bat and ball together cost $1.10. How much does the ball cost? About half of 
us immediately give the answer ten cents. We give this answer as quickly as we did in the first task. In 
addition, we feel equally good about the answer. 
System 2 Thinking 
However, the correct answer is five cents. Those who realize that five cents is the correct answer 
probably also had the initial answer ten cents. However, they then turned on System 2 thinking. S2 
thinking takes S1 answers as mere suggestions to be tested. If the ball is really ten cents, the bat must 
be a dollar. A dollar is not a dollar more than ten cents, of course. The correct answer is that bat is a 
dollar and five cents, and the ball is five cents. 
In the bat and ball task, our brain did a disturbing thing. Rather than solving the actual problem, which 
would involve algebraic thinking, it solved a different problem. Kahneman [2011] notes that this 
frequently happens. Our brain often solves a simpler problem than the one we wish to solve. It then 
interpolates the answer to the actual problem. Yet when this happens, our brain gives us no indication 
that this has happened. More broadly, System 1 thinking gives us no indication of how well founded 
its conclusion is. As Kahneman has said, it does not exactly lie to us. Rather, giving us an assessment 
of its conclusion is not part of what it does. However, confidence in System 1 thinking cannot be used 
as an excuse for believing everything it suggests. 
It seems like we should suspect every conclusion to be wrong. We should always use S2 thinking. 
There are, however, several reasons why we do not and cannot. 
• First, if we actually applied S2 thinking all the time to question everything, it would drive 
us crazy [Gilovich 1991]. It would be an extreme form of obsessive-compulsive disorder. 
• Second, we cannot sustain S2 thinking for more than a brief period. It is literally 
exhausting. 
• Third, even when we do turn on S2 thinking, S2 thinking is difficult and certainly does 
not always give the correct answer. The bat and ball problem is best approached by 
algebra, and we all expect to make mistakes when we do algebra. 
The fourth and most subtle reason we do not always use S2 thinking is that we usually do not see a 
need to do so. In the revenue-and-expense problem, you were probably very comfortable in your 
answer. As noted earlier, whenever S1 gives us an answer, we tend to be comfortable about it, 
whether it is right or wrong. We are seldom prodded to suspect the answer. Sometimes we are of 
course, but Allwood [1984], who observed problem solving behavior, found that only some of these 
instances lead to successful problem resolution. Many undetected errors generated no suspicion at all. 
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Allwood [1984], however, also noticed that participants sometimes simply paused to check their 
recent calculations. This is how they caught many of the errors that had generated no specific 
indications or even vague unease. This was also how they caught many of the errors that had 
generated unease but had not been caught earlier. Kellog [1994] found that when people write, they 
spend about a third of their time pausing to plan or check their work. Allwood called this activity a 
“standard check.” We will call it unprompted error checking. Allwood noted that while this type of 
error checking is good it is far from being a cure-all for errors. 
4 IMPROVING SPREADSHEET ACCURACY 
In the first section of this paper, we saw that there are substantial, compelling, and unanimous 
research findings that spreadsheets are at high risk of spreadsheet errors. In the next section, we saw 
how human cognition, in both perception and thinking, give us an approximate view of the world that 
works most of the time but that hides information from us, giving us a distorted experience of what 
errors we make and how good we are at finding errors. 
If the research is true, and if we wish to act on empirical findings like a pilot trusting his or her 
instruments in darkness instead of physical sensations about an airplane’s orientation in the sky, what 
should we do? Figure 5 may give us some guidance. To create a program or spreadsheet, the creator 
usually begins with modules that are later integrated into larger units and finally into whole programs 
or spreadsheets. In software development, module testing is called unit testing. Spreadsheet 
development experiments create spreadsheet models that are similar in size to software modules. The 
figure shows that error rates are similar at the end of the module stage (but before extensive unit 
testing) for spreadsheets and programs. 
Figure 5: Error Rates at the Module and Final Stages of Development 
 
 
We saw this similarity earlier. The figure also shows final error rates in delivered programs, based on 
errors found after delivery. Note that roughly 90% of the errors in a program are removed during 
development. 
We saw earlier that commercial spreadsheet inspections (audits) and testing of similar intensity found 
cell error rates of 1.2%, 2.2%, and 2.5%. These inspections averaged about one person-week apiece. 
Powell, Baker, and Lawson [2008] only found a cell error rate of 0.9% when hardcoding, which all 
other studies treat as a qualitative error, was removed. However, the average time spent per 
spreadsheet was only 3.25 hours. Clermont, Hanin, and Mittermeier [2000] found a quantitative cell 
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error rate of only 0.4%. However, it only used static analysis auditing software. Anderson [2004] and 
Aurigemma and Panko [14] compared errors discovered with this type of software to actual errors in 
spreadsheets and found that they were not effective in finding errors. Anderson’s study found that the 
programs he used only caught 27% of the errors he seeded in the spreadsheet used in the experiment. 
Aurigemma and Panko’s seven testers found far fewer errors made by actual developers (natural 
errors instead of seeded errors). Aurigemma and Panko, however, did not use the mapping functions 
available in this software, although the spreadsheets did not have a strong block structure. 
Of course, while cell error rates (CERs) at the module and final stage are similar, they should not be. 
Inspections of final spreadsheets should have undergone such extensive testing that few errors should 
remain—as in the case of software development. Furthermore, while the spreadsheets developed in 
experiments have known correct solutions, all errors can be found. In turn, inspections of operational 
spreadsheets only report CERs based on discovered errors. Given human limitations in discovering 
errors, the inspection CERs are likely to be larger than the three numbers shown. Unfortunately, none 
of the inspections of operational spreadsheets had multiple inspectors inspect the spreadsheet 
individually and report their errors. This would have allowed a statistical estimate of remaining errors, 
so that error detection effectiveness could be assessed. 
What is different between software development and spreadsheet development? Initially, 
programmers attempted to reduce errors by writing structured programs and using languages with 
such features as strong data typing. While this helped somewhat, the results of improved development 
practices were modest. Brooks [1987] summarized this modest progress succinctly. He said that there 
were no silver bullets in software development. 
In the end, commercial software developers addressed the problem of errors by focusing primarily on 
testing. They accepted that errors would occur and would continue to occur in acceptable numbers 
even when good development practices are used. Over time, they had to keep increasing testing until 
they reached acceptable final error rates. Jones (1998) looked at 84 projects in 27 organizations. 
Testing time ranged from 27% to 34% of total development resources. In every case, subjects reported 
that not enough time was spent testing. Later, Kimberland (2004) reported that Microsoft software 
development teams spent 40% to 60% of their total working time in testing.  
For software, dynamic testing based on well-chosen test cases with oracles (correct answers) is the 
most common form of testing. This is good when there is simple final behavior. For instance, if the 
software is designed to copy changed authentication credentials to all authentication servers, it is 
relatively easy to see if the software does this under various plausible scenarios. In spreadsheets, 
however, results are derived from chains of calculations. For each calculation, test cases for a dozen 
or more equivalence classes may have to be undertaken. This would result in a combinatorial 
explosion in test cases to compute a final value. Furthermore, spreadsheet software does not have 
native functionality for implementing this. 
For the unit testing of new or modified modules, commercial software companies often turn to static 
analysis, in which the code is examined without running it. There are several informal methods for 
static inspection, but firms that use static analysis typically use a specific formal method called code 
inspection. The code inspection methodology was originally developed by Fagan [1976, 1986] and 
was later developed by others. Today, it is normal to replace the final meeting in which errors are 
reported, assessed, and accepted or not accepted with an online process to do these things [Cohen, 
2006] 
Fagan [1976, 1986] grounded code inspection in empirical analysis. A prime tenet was the obligation 
to report on the broad results of code inspections, at least in the aggregate. Consequently, code 
inspection has produced data on tens of thousands of commercial code inspections. This resulted in 
refinements as different approaches were actually proven to produce better results. People who argued 
that things should be done in a certain way because they were experts often found themselves wrong. 
Good practice emerged based on merit, not on the authority of the proposer. 
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Although Fagan [1976 1986] and later developers did not base their work on human error research, 
the code inspection is deeply consistent with this research. 
A code inspection is always done by teams, never by individuals. Teams typically have three to eight 
members. This is consistent with the fact that humans are only modestly effective at finding errors. 
Even with team inspection, code inspections typically only find 60% to 80% of all errors in a 
module[Boehm and Basili 2001, Eick, et al. 1992, Fagan 1986, Hall 1996, Jones 1986, Jones 1998]. 
The rest must be found in later testing. Based on data provided from code inspections, single-person 
code inspection would only catch 20% to 40% of all errors. Panko [1999] conducted an experiment 
applying code inspection methodology to spreadsheet inspection. He found that individuals only 
caught 63% of all errors in the spreadsheet they examined. In teams of three, the average was 83%. 
This is a modest percentage increase, but produced large jumps in detection rates for the most 
difficult-to-find errors. Inspection by individuals would be difficult to justify in spreadsheet 
developers. 
Code inspection always begins with an initial meeting in which the ground rules are laid out, roles are 
assigned, and, most importantly, the team is taken through the program line by line to ensure that all 
inspectors understand the purpose of the module, the purpose of each part, and how the code works. 
During this process, some errors may be noted by the inspectors, but that is not the purpose of the 
initial meeting. The initial meeting is important because program code is not self-documenting, even 
when comments are used. (As developers sometimes remark, “That’s why they call it code.”). In their 
in-depth interviews with spreadsheet developers, both Nardi and Miller [1991] and Hendry and Green 
[1994] noted that this problem is serious with spreadsheets. While the rectangular structure of 
worksheets is ideal for some models, it sometimes creates difficult challenges. Difficult challenges 
tend to lead to complex precedent structures. Joseph [2000] conducted a code inspection experiment 
on spreadsheets. He confirmed the importance of the initial meeting, especially for complex logic 
flows. 
After the initial meeting, the inspectors work on the code individually. Initially, the only goal was to 
develop a very good understanding of the code. Over time, it became more common to make this the 
stage for doing most error discovery and recording. This stage also has been the most studied and 
analyzed empirically. 
Due to limits of human vigilance, individual inspections must be limited to about an hour. Inspection 
is mentally exhausting, and longer inspection periods produce a sharp drop in error identification. The 
statement inspection rate also must be limited to about 100 lines of code per hour for best results. 
Faster inspection rates again give lower error detection yield. Taken together, these limitations mean 
that code inspection can only be applied to software modules, not entire programs. Give the data on 
how rapidly error yield decreases over longer periods and correct inspection rates, and given the 
importance of understanding what one is inspecting, inspecting an entire program makes no sense. 
In the review meeting, the team meets again. Initially, this was the stage in which errors were sought 
by active inspection. It gradually became the time to gather reports, determine if they are legitimate 
errors, rate the severity of errors, and create a list of errors to be removed. The team does not attempt 
to recommend fixes for these errors. Unfortunately, the need to have a review meeting often delayed 
the results of code inspections. Today, this stage is done online using application software designed 
for this work. In fact, the software now manages all stages. 
After the review meeting, the code inspection is documented. Based on this documentation and data 
collected by the application, patterns for meetings can assessed. In addition, there needs to be error 
tracking to verify that errors are corrected. 
In spreadsheet development, in contrast, all studies since the 1980s have found that detailed 
inspection is rare. When it does exist, it typically uses single inspectors and covers chunks of code 
that are very large with fast inspection rates. 
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We argue, based on human error research and specific software and spreadsheet research, that code 
inspection should be used to test spreadsheets. Empirical analysis will be needed to develop size and 
speed metrics for spreadsheet inspection, but we are likely to find that we will need to spend 20% to 
40% of our development resources on testing. Doing this will be expensive. Not doing it is likely to 
be unprofessional. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we saw that there is substantial, compelling, and unanimous evidence that spreadsheet 
errors are occurring at a rate that corporations should see as unacceptable. Humans have many 
intuitions about errors, but the way our cognition works means that we are conscious of very few of 
our errors. Consequently, we tend to believe, among other things, that few spreadsheets have material 
errors, that we make few errors, that anyone can make only rare errors and catch almost all errors if 
they just tried harder and spent more time, and that we know how to reduce spreadsheet errors 
through good practice. 
If we accept that our “experiences” regarding errors is impaired, so that we must turn to human error 
research, software industry experience, and spreadsheet error research, then we need to do far more 
testing. Testing is not merely one of many error controls. It is likely to be by far the most important 
error control. When asked if their spreadsheet contains an error, developers in one unpublished study 
often said something to the effect that they did not see how that would be possible because they spent 
“so much time” testing it—although they always added that, of course, everyone makes mistakes. 
When asked if they were spending 20% to 40% of their time doing testing, their typical response was 
something to the effect that that would be crazy. If spreadsheet development is to be regarded as a true 
profession, the biggest change is likely to be a practice requirement for very extensive and expensive 
testing. 
What about the many prescriptions that are touted for reducing spreadsheet errors? Many begin with a 
statement that, “the problem with spreadsheets is X.” X may be having end users do development 
instead of professionals, a failure to use a program with strong data typing, or many other things. 
Although proposers know that they are correct because of their “experience,” this knowledge should 
not be viewed as reliable. In addition, almost all prescriptions are for development practices, and if 
there are testing prescriptions as part of these practices, they are usually rudimentary. Senders and 
Moray [1991], in their review of human error research, noted that many error reduction prescriptions 
have bad side effects. For example, requiring strong typing could put more burden on developers who 
are already overloaded and making errors as a result. Given limits in human attention and other 
resources, adding burdens could increase errors much more than it reduces the type of error it was 
intended to reduce. Given that out experience of errors in unreliable, intuitions about how to reduce 
errors should not be taken seriously unless they are rigorously tested. As in the case of code 
inspection, we can draw from human error literature and proven practices in other areas and test 
whether it is feasible and effective to apply them to spreadsheets. Medicines must be tested to prove 
that they are safe and effective before they are accepted. We should require the same rigor for 
spreadsheet development prescriptions. 
In software development, many students and professionals have adopted Watts Humphrey’s Personal 
Software Process (PSP), in which the person keeps detailed information on their software 
development activities. The goal of PSP is to counteract intuitive ideas about software errors with 
actual data. The results are typically a shock to the programmer using it. However, the goal is not to 
shock but to help the programmer develop better estimation skills for time, resources, and the work 
needed to reduce errors.  
When people are confronted with their actual error rates they are typically shocked. For example, one 
study examined how frequently people hit the wrong pedal when they drive. The project director was 
worried that the practice would be so rare that measuring it would be extremely difficult. When the 
team did the study, they found to their amazement that the frequency of hitting the wrong pedal was 
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about once per hour [Spiegel 2010]. Self-knowledge is the most potent force for navigating through 
work. 
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